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Trademarks as Keywords: For Sale or for Infringement?
BY OLGA VODOLAZSCHI
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the Internet has slowly been replacing the traditional way of
a customer-salesperson shopping experience. Not long ago, computers were luxury items.
But today, a computer or any electronic device is part of our daily routine. With just a
few “searches” one can order online a hamburger delivery or buy a car.
But along with technological advances, legal concerns arise as well. A recent
phenomenon that raises some legal questions is the keyword advertising, which is a way
for companies to advertise with search engines.1 Advertisers purchase “keywords” so that
ads appear next to search results after a consumer has typed these particular keywords.
The legal question arises when for instance, Company A buys Company B’s (that is the
direct competitor) trademark as a keyword. Is Company B entitled to sue Company A for
trademark infringement? Is the claim actionable under the Lanham Act?
This paper will start with an outline of the traditional framework of a trademark
infringement claim, followed by the latest legal developments in light of the Internet
phenomenon. Next, the article will focus on the seminal decisions from the Ninth Circuit
that shed new light on the Internet trademark infringement analysis. The paper will also
address the potential implications of the recent Ninth Circuit decisions on future Internetrelated trademark claims.

1

How Keywords Work, GOOGLE,
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704371 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
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II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE INTERNET WORLD
Google, Bing and Yahoo are the three search engine pioneers of online
commerce.2 Google, and more specifically its online advertising program AdWords,
plays the main part in the Internet-related trademark infringement saga. It is a very
popular tool that in 2011 brought over $36 billion in revenue.3 Google began its
advertising tool based on keywords in 2000. The program started including trademarks as
keywords in 2004.4 The architecture of a Google results page is of a particular interest for
the discussion in this paper. Figure 1 is a screenshot of results when “ActiveBatch”
trademark was used as a search term.
Figure 1: Google Search for “ActiveBatch”

Paid Results

2

Auction Bidding

David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Keywords: Much Ado About Something? (Univ. of
S.F., Law Research Paper No. 2012-20, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2110364.
3
2012 Financial Tables, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2012).
4
Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 2, at 10.
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The screenshot above represents the disputed use of “ActiveBatch” trademark as a
keyword in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.,5 the seminal
Ninth Circuit case discussed herein.6 As a prelude to the discussion of the case, the
screenshot above illustrates the display of Network Automation’s website in the “Ads”
section after searching for “ActiveBatch,” the trademark owned by Advanced Systems
Concepts, Network Automation’s competitor.7 The links in the slightly shaded area above
the natural results list are the paid results. Each of these links is there because the website
won its position on Google search results page in an auction bidding.
While AdWords tool is quite fruitful for Google, it might also be quite lucrative
for lawyers in terms of legal ramifications. A client’s trademark, that is diligently
guarded and policed, when used as a Google “keyword” helps competitors to divert the
consumers from the client’s products. In response to searches of these keywords, Google
provides “Sponsored Links” – competitors’ products ads.8 A question arises – is there
enough legal ground to bring a claim for trademark infringement?
But before jumping to the legal discussion, there are some real-world points worth
mentioning. First, some trademark owners would not even bring a claim against their
competitors, since probably most of the trademark owners are using the same strategy.9
Priority for a company’s marketing team is revenue, rather than mark policing. This is the
essence of the daily battle between marketing and legal teams within a company.

5

638 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011).
See discussion infra Section III.
7
See supra Figure 1.
8
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Advertisers pay Google based on the
number of times Internet users “click” on the advertisement, so as to link to the advertiser’s website.”).
9
Uli Widmaier, From Metatags to Sponsored Ads: The Evolution of the Internet-Related Trademark
Infringement Doctrine, 4 LANDSLIDE 3 (2012).
6
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Second, AdWords is such an important advertising tool for many trademark
owners that a claim for trademark infringement becomes of secondary importance.10
While these two points might seem as an oversimplification of the matters, there is a need
to bring more factors into the picture, such as the size of the potentially liable company,
its recognition on the market and its litigation resources. What about a scenario where
Company A brings a claim against Company B for trademark infringement, and at the
same time engages itself in the same practice? The following example helps to illustrate
the dilemma.
In Rescuecom,11 a computer repair company brought a claim against Google for
recommending the Rescuecom mark to its competitors as a search term for purchase.
After the Second Circuit found “use in commerce,” and the case went back to trial court,
Rescuecom abandoned its litigation.12 While fighting with Google over the use of
Rescuecom mark, Rescuecom seemed to fight the opposite battle with Best Buy, which
demanded Rescuecom to stop using “Geek Squad” as a keyword.13 Best Buy held “Geek
Squad” mark for use in connection with computer repair services.14 Best Buy maintained
a toll-free telephone number, 1-800-GEEK-SQU, which consumers could call for
computer repair services.15 At the same time, Rescuecom also maintained a toll-free
number, 1-800-GEEK-SQA, a misspelling of Best Buy’s trademark.16 In addition,

10

Widmaier, supra note 9.
562 F.3d at 126.
12
Eric Goldman, Rescuecom Abandons Its Litigation Against Google, Tech. & Mktg. L. Blog (Mar. 5, 2010,
10:45 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/rescuecom_aband.htm.
13
Rescuecom Corp. v. BBY Solutions, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-01149-FJS-DEP (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 14, 2009).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
11
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Rescuecom used the keyword phrase “geek squad” to display an advertisement for its
computer repair services.17
According to Eric Goldman, law professor and director of the High Tech Law
Institute at Santa Clara University, “Rescuecom’s position in the lawsuit against Google
is “intrinsically inconsistent” with its stance in the Best Buy litigation.”18 Gaming the
issue on both sides would most probably not play well with the judges. Thus, companies
should choose their battles and weigh the litigation costs and the probability of favorable
outcome against the opponent.
Internet trademark infringement issues surfaced only about a decade ago. To
demonstrate infringement of a registered mark under the Lanham Act, which governs
federal trademark infringement claims, a party must prove (1) that the alleged infringer
“uses [the mark] in commerce”, and (2) such action or the use of such or some other
subject “is likely to cause confusion” in the marketplace.19 Thus the question is whether
use of a trademark as a keyword rises to the level of “use in commerce.”20
The Second Circuit was the first to answer this question in the affirmative.21 In
Rescuecom, a computer repair company alleged that “Google has recommended the
Rescuecom trademark to its competitors as a search term to be purchased.”22 The court

17

Id.
Wendy Davis, Rescuecom Geeks Out In Court After Victory Over Google, Media Post News (Jan. 20,
2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/121008/#axzz2DG3jKP85.
19
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . .”).
20
Id.
21
Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 127.
22
Id. at 126.
18
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noted “Google displays, offers, and sells Rescuecom’s mark to Google’s advertising
customers when selling its advertising services.”23
Thus “Google’s utilization of Rescuecom’s mark fits literally within” Lanham
Act’s definition of “use of commerce.”24 The court concluded that Google “used
[Rescuecom’s mark] in the sale or advertising of services and the services . . . rendered in
commerce.”25
“Use in commerce” is not enough though. The crux of a trademark infringement
claim is proving the second prong, likelihood of confusion. On one hand, the technology
is advancing on the sophistication ladder: from metatags to domain names to keyword
advertising. On the other hand, the question is whether it is even worth for trademark
owners to engage in a long battle against Google or its competitors.

III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT – THE “HOMELAND” OF LEGAL BREAKTHROUGHS
(a) Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.26
The Brookfield case is the Ninth Circuit decision that laid the foundation for the
Internet trademark law, specifically domain names and metatags.27
The plaintiff ran a “computer software featuring a searchable database containing
entertainment-industry related information marketed under the “MovieBuff” mark.28 The

23

Id. at 129.
Id. at 129; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
25
Id.
26
174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
27
Widmaier, supra note 9; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1045 (“Metatags are HTML code intended to describe
the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us are
the “description” and “keyword” metatags. . . . The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the
text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be “hit” in a search for that keyword and
the higher of the list of “hits” the web page will appear.”).
28
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.
24
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defendant registered a domain name “moviebuff.com”, allegedly plaintiff’s registered
mark.29
When it comes to the second element of a trademark infringement claim, there is
little uniformity among circuits on the analysis of likelihood of confusion. Even though
the actual factors for likelihood of confusion are mainly the same, each circuit has its own
version.
The Ninth Circuit follows the Sleekcraft test.30 When first facing questions of
trademark infringement in the Internet context, the Brookfield court noted that the “eightfactor test for likelihood of confusion is pliant.”31 Even over a decade ago, the court
believed that there is need for an “ acute aware[ness] of excessive rigidity when applying
the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies required a flexible approach.”32
The court warned against “simply launching into a mechanical application of the eightfactor Sleekcraft test.”33
To establish whether the defendant used plaintiff’s trademark in the domain name,
the Brookfield court simplified the analysis of likelihood of confusion using only three
out of the traditional eight Sleekraft factors: “(1) the virtual identity of marks, (2) the
relatedness of plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web

29

Id. at 1042.
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit test for likelihood
of confusion consists of eight factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree
of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8)
likelihood of expansion of the product lines.
31
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
32
Id.
33
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146.
30
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as a marketing channel.”34 With fewer factors, it seemed easier to prove trademark
infringement.
In addition to presenting a new standard in Internet-related cases, “Brookfield was
the first to present a claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet.”35 In addition to
using plaintiff’s mark in defendant’s domain name, plaintiff alleged use of its mark in the
HTML code of defendant’s site.36
The court noted that “[u]sing another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like
posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store. . . . Customers are not
confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from [a
competitor of a trademark owner] and they have no reason to believe that [the
competitor] is related to, or in any way sponsored by, [the trademark owner].”37 Under
this scenario, the competitor is still acquiring the goodwill of the trademark owner.38
The court concluded “that consumer confusion was likely, particularly given the
nature of consumers at issue, who included casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that
they had mistakenly clicked on to West Coast’s site when they had intended to reach
Brookfield’s” site.39 In Brookfield, the initial interest confusion replaced the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis that did not hold in that case.

34

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 n.16.
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148; Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway and
Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975). Steinweg and Steinway were competitors in the pianos
business. Id. Potential customers could rely on the reputation acquired by Steinway and “think that there is
some connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos.” Id. at 1342.
36
174 F.3d at 1061.
37
Id. at 1064.
38
Id.
39
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146.
35

8

In metatags analysis, the court also found initial interest confusion in using
MovieBuff in the HTML code of the defendant’s website.40 The consumers were directed
to the defendant’s website through an invisible to them use of the plaintiff’s mark, thus
leading to initial interest confusion. When a consumer searched for “MovieBuff” the list
would include both MovieBuff and West Coast websites.41 Since they were prominently
displayed, when a consumer clicked on West Coast (that used MoviedBuff in its
metatags) she was aware of the page she was visiting.
There was initial interest confusion in metatags analysis “by using Brookfield’s
mark MovieBuff to direct persons searching for Brookfield’s product to the West Coast
site [that] derived an improper benefit from the goodwill Brookfield developed.”42

(b) Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.43
While the role of metatags faded away, the Brookfield analysis held up in another
Ninth Circuit case dealing with keywords.44 In dispute were the banner ads (not clearly
labeled) linked to consumers’ search of plaintiff’s marks such as “playboy” and
“playmate”.45 Defendant Netscape offered a version of a keyword advertising program
and sold lists of terms to sponsors that if searched would display the sponsor’s
advertisement on the result page.46 “Playboy” was among more that 400 terms on one of

40

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061.
Id.
42
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146.
43
354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 1022.
46
Id.
41
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such lists.47 The court reasoned that such practice was quite similar to the use of metatags
in the Brookfield case and found initial interest confusion.
Applying the Brookfield three-part test, plaintiff’s mark was strong, the parties’
services were both in the adult entertainment business, and both parties used Internet as
their marketing channel. The court analyzed the nature of goods and consumers and
concluded that “the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials on the Internet is
easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if other options, particularly
graphic ones, appear more quickly.”48 Consumers were easily diverted to other
competitors’ websites following the linked banner advertisements that were “unlabeled”
and thus misled them into believing a Playboy affiliation.49
Of particular importance was the concurrence of Judge Marsha Berzon who raised
a question of whether the consumer was confused by the practices applied in Brookfield
and Playboy, or rather presented with a clear choice.50 In Brookfield, even though the
defendant used the plaintiff’s mark of MovieBuff as a metatag for its website
westcoastvideo.com, “[c]onsumers were free to choose the official moviebuff.com
website [among all other search results] and were not hijacked or misdirected
elsewhere.”51 In contrast, the Playboy decision applied to “situations in which the banner
advertisements are not labeled or identified.”52

47

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1031.
49
Id. at 1025.
50
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 1036.
52
Id.
48
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If there is a cheaper and more accessible or desirable product, why not “suggest”
it to consumers? After all, the Lanham Act protects not only intellectual property but also
consumers who should be offered options and be allowed to choose. As long as
consumers are faced with clear choices, rather than being diverted from one website to
another using a competitor’s trademark, there should be no legal concerns.

(c) Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.53
With Internet entering more and more households and with consumers getting
rather sophisticated, the recent Ninth Circuit decision came just in time to announce a
new standard for the analysis of Internet-related trademark infringement claims.54
The court noted that it “did not intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to
forever enshrine these three factors – now often referred to as the “Internet trinity” or
“Internet troika” – as the test for trademark infringement on the Internet.”55 In Network
Automation, the two parties were direct competitors in the job scheduling software
market.56 Network advertised its software by purchasing such keyword as “ActiveBatch”
which was the other party’s registered trademark.57 A consumer, entering such a
keyword, would “produce a results page showing “www.NetworkAutomation.com” as a
sponsored link, above the natural results list.58
The Internet scene has changed significantly since 1999, the year of the
Brookfield decision. Thus, “it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for

53

638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1154.
55
Id. at 1148.
56
Id. at 1142.
57
Id.
58
Id.
54
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every type of potential online commercial activity.”59 The court stated that “[d]epending
on the facts of each specific case arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as
more illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.”60 Taking into account the
technological breakthroughs in the Internet arena since the Brookfield decision, “[t]he
“troika” is a particularly poor fit for the question presented here.”61
For instance, Brookfield third factor, simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel, is quite irrelevant today.62 Every company seems to turn to the services of the
Web for its business promotion and customer expansion. In the era of Internet, “it would
be the rare commercial retailer that did not advertise online, and the shared use of a
ubiquitous marketing channel does not shed much light on the likelihood of consumer
confusion.”63
The Ninth Circuit turned to the Sleekcraft factors, its version of likelihood of
confusion analysis.64 Ultimately, in the analysis of the keyword advertising trademark
infringement, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the most relevant factors to the analysis of the
likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding
context on the screen displaying the results page.”65
Of particular interest is the new fourth factor that the court brought into the
analysis of Internet-related trademark infringement claims. The proper partition of
59

Id. at 1148.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1151; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 n.16.
63
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151.
64
Id. at 1149.
65
Id. at 1154.
60
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“search results pages so that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for
“sponsored” links” seemed to be the deciding factor in the court’s decision.
The change of heart in the analysis of Internet-related cases has to do a lot with
the way consumers started treating and perceiving the Internet. Today Internet is part of
our daily routine. If before, consumers could be confused between who is the owner of a
website and of a banner ad, today “the court assumes that Internet users are thoroughly
experienced using search engines, including distinguishing between natural and
sponsored search results.”66
Going forward “[t]he appearance of the advertisements and their surrounding
context on the user’s screen” are factors to take into account when analyzing keyword
advertising cases.67 Thus, “Google and Bing have partitioned their search results pages so
that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for “sponsored” links.”68 In
other words, the court believed that a consumer searching for “ActiveBatch” would first
be looking within the primary natural search results and not within “sponsored links,”
secondary search results that would display Network’s website.
Prominent display and assumption of consumer sophistication is what saved the
defendant from the trademark infringement claim. It would seem then that today’s
technologically savvy and Internet dependent consumer would always be capable of
avoiding confusion in the courts’ eyes since “[c]learly labeling the source of the

66

Widmaier, supra note 9.
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.
68
Id.
67
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competing product in Internet advertising will go a long way toward protecting the
advertiser from a claim of trademark infringement.”69
With the Ninth Circuit being the homeland of the Silicon Valley and therefore of
the majority of technological breakthroughs, no wonder that it provides other circuits
with revised analyses in Internet-related issues.
The Ninth Circuit seems to stand for “flexibility” in the analysis of Internetrelated trademark infringement claims. While Network Automation is a reformist
decision, it is nevertheless troubling. The court claimed that Brookfield analysis should
not be “forever enshrine[d]” and that “[d]epending on the facts of each specific case
arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more illuminating on the question of
consumer confusion.”70 Though the court moved away from the Brookfield test, it did not
discard it completely. Therefore, the troubling question is what test should the courts use
in future Internet-related cases?
While the Ninth Circuit did not openly overrule the Brookfield analysis, the
decision seems obsolete enough for our century. First, the Network Automation court
discussed today’s irrelevance of the third element of the test, the simultaneous use of the
Web as a marketing channel.71 Second, the Brookfield element of relatedness of
plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods seems quite irrelevant as well. A company would be
interested in buying another trademark as a keyword only if the services or products are
related enough for the consumers to be easily tempted to make the switch. Relatedness of

69

Lisa Dejaco, Internet Advertising: Two Competitors, One Trademark, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, IP Insight,
May 2011.
70
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.
71
See supra p. 7.
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goods would facilitate consumers to be “likely confused” or “initial interest confused” to
prefer a competing product.
Going forward, the best approach seems to examine the Sleekcraft factors (or the
equivalent in the appropriate circuit) and whatever “other factors may emerge as more
illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.”72 For instance, Network Automation
introduced a novel fourth factor discussed above, “the labeling and appearance of the
advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.”73
Overall, the Ninth Circuit opened the door to “flexibility” in future case-by-case analyses
of Internet-related trademark infringement claims.

(d) Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari74
The Ninth Circuit has also recently addressed the question of using competitor’s
trademark in domain names.75 In Tabari, the defendant operated an online dealership
through “buy-a-lexus.com” and “buyorleaselexus.com.”76 The question was whether the
use of “lexus” in the domain name would cause confusion as to the source of the
defendant’s website.77
Once again, the refinement of consumers came to the defendant’s rescue since
“[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite sophisticated . . . and
won’t be fooled into thinking that the prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at
mercedesboots.com, or homes at mercedeshomes.com . . . .”78 Usually, “[w]hen a domain
72

Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.
Id. at 1154.
74
610 F.3d 1171 (2010).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1174.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1178.
73
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name consists only of the trademark followed by .com, or some other suffix like .org or
.net, it will typically suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”79
Under Tabari, a defendant’s use of a trademark combined with other words in the domain
name constitutes nominative fair use and does not rise to infringement.80 The traditional
Sleekcraft analysis does not apply in cases “where a defendant uses the mark to refer to
the trademarked good itself.”81 Here, the Tabaris were “using the term Lexus to describe
their business of brokering Lexus automobiles.”82 Since the Tabaris needed to make their
business known to the consumers it was “nearly impossible to do without mentioning
Lexus, be it via domain name, metatag, radio jingle, telephone solicitation or blimp.”83
In Tabari, as well as in the subsequent Network Automation case, the Ninth
Circuit put the decision-making in the hands of consumers, believing that “prudent and
experienced internet consumers are accustomed to such exploration by trial and error”
and therefore “don’t form any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until
they’ve seen the landing page – if then.”84
Both Ninth Circuit seminal cases, Network Automation and Tabari are premised
on today’s understanding that consumers are highly sophisticated to be “fooled” by

79

Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1175-76. (“In cases where a nominative fair use defense is raised, we ask whether (1) the product
was “readily identifiable” without use of the mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than necessary; or
(3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder . . . . This test [is]
designed to address the risk that nominative use of the mark will inspire a mistaken belief on the part of
consumers that the speaker is sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder. The third factor speaks
directly to the risk of such confusion and the others do so indirectly: Consumers may reasonably infer
sponsorship or endorsement if a company uses an unnecessary trademark or “more” of a mark than
necessary.”) (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-309 (9th Cir.
1992)).
81
Id. at 1175.
82
Id. at 1175.
83
Id. at 1181.
84
Id. at 1179.
80
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domain names, sponsored links or any other marketing tricks companies might have. The
idea that the Internet is innovative is long gone.
A recent case from the Third Circuit has already followed in the footsteps of the
Ninth Circuit analysis.85 The case involved two companies that provided web research
services to college students who consider transferring.86 The plaintiff, AcademyOne,
purchased the defendant’s trademark in Google AdWords.87 Though the Third Circuit has
its own version of the likelihood of confusion factors, known as the Lapp factors,88 the
CollegeSource court decided to “place emphasis on the four factors noted in Network
Automation”89 in addition to the traditional analysis.
In CollegeSource, the defendant offered evidence of actual confusion factor. It
was sparse since “there have only been 65 instances [over one month] in which Internet
users searched for CollegeSource, [and] were presented with AcademyOne’s
advertisements, and clicked to AcademyOne’s website.”90 The court also analyzed the
labeling ad appearance of the advertisements Network Automation factor.91 The court
emphasized the display of AcademyOne’s advertisements “presented in separate sections
of the search results [and] especially the clearly differentiated text boxes and the fact that
CollegeSource’s name does not appear within the language of the advertisement.”92
Again, the court relied heavily on the sophistication of consumers. The
CollegeSource court reasoned that “consumers seeking to obtain transfer information are

85

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012).
Id. at *1.
87
Id. at *5.
88
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3rd Cir. 1983).
89
CollegeSource, 2012 WL 5269213 at *16.
90
Id. at *17.
91
Id. at *18.
92
Id.
86
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likely to practice diligence in their research” and thus “are not likely to be confused by
Internet advertising.”93
The Third Circuit did not just take for granted the sophistication of the 21st
century consumer proclaimed by the Ninth Circuit. Rather, while emphasizing the four
Network Automation factors, the CollegeSource court took into account the nature of the
market (i.e. decision-making resources for college transfers) and the type of consumer
(i.e. college students diligent in their research).

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL ASSUMPTIONS
Analyzing the above Ninth Circuit decisions, it seems that there are a series of
assumptions standing behind the judicial reasoning. As already discussed, the crucial
assumption in Network Automation and Tabari cases is the sophistication of today’s
consumer. While I would like to believe that all of the technological advances caught up
with each consumer, there is a degree of skepticism as to consumers’ sophistication
across the board. Are we all able to distinguish the “paid ads” from the organic search
results on Google page? The Tabari court pointed out that there should be no trouble for
a consumer to differentiate among lexus.com, a Lexus sponsored website, and
mercedesboots.com, a website clearly not affiliated with the German manufacturer
Mercedes.94

93

Id. at *18-19.
Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1178 (“Consumers who use the internet for shopping … won’t be fooled into
thinking that the prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at mercedesboots.com, or homes at
mercedeshomes.com, or that comcastsucks.org is sponsored or endorsed by the TV cable company just
because the string of letters making up its trademark appears in the domain.”).
94

18

Another question that the Ninth Circuit does not seem to ponder over is consumer
goals and expectations. It does not take into account that consumers could have different
expectations when typing in a trademark as a keyword. Is the consumer typing “Nike” in
Google search box with a purpose to specifically find Nike sports apparel, or is the search
a proxy for sports attire and the consumer is potentially interested in such brands as
Puma, Adidas or New Balance? It seems logical that in the case of a consumer with a
focused search (i.e. looking specifically for “Nike” sports apparel) she would be more
prone to likelihood of confusion, rather than a consumer having an expansive goal of
simply exploring sports apparel under a chosen proxy brand such as “Nike.”
In order for the courts to have reached the decisions discussed above, the Ninth
Circuit had to assume that if a consumer is typing trademark A, she is only looking for
products or services under mark A. This is quite a sweeping assumption, assuming that
courts are dealing with the sophisticated consumer that the Ninth Circuit proclaimed is
able to explore by “trial and error.”95
Thus, the consumer in the Playboy case, searching for “playmate” or “playboy”
might as well be using these marks as search words for a generalization of adult-oriented
content, rather than for specifically Playboy sponsored materials. Under such
circumstances, there could hardly be any initial interest confusion. Often, consumers are
typing a trademark as a search word because that particular mark is a famous one that
comes first to mind and could lead to similar products and services.
According to a survey led by two law professors, “consumers may use trademarks
as a generic reference for some categories of goods and services (i.e. Hertz = rental cars),
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and use trademarks to search for specific products for other categories of goods and
services (i.e. Macbook = Apple computers).”96 A simple blanket assumption of
consumers’ goals and expectations seems too broad of a generalization. Again, it is quite
troubling taking into account that the Ninth Circuit is elevating the consumer to a high
level of sophistication and technological familiarity.

V. THE 21ST CENTURY SOPHISTICATED CONSUMER
The Ninth Circuit is making a generalization in terms “that the default degree of
consumer care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and
online commerce becomes commonplace.”97 Today’s modern consumer is used to
“exploration by trail and error” and is ready to “skip from site to site, ready to hit the
back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.”98
Drawing a parallel across the four Ninth Circuit cases discussed above, it seems
that the important factor is not the increasing sophistication of an Internet browser, but
rather the nature of the business and of the consumer searching for products within the
particular niche of the online marketplace.
In Brookfield, the court dealt with “casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that
they had mistakenly clicked on to [a competitor’s] site when they had intended to reach
[plaintiff’s’]” site.99
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In Playboy, the court was looking at a “searcher seeking adult-oriented materials
on the Internet” who would be “easily diverted […] if other products, particularly graphic
ones, appear more quickly.”100
In Tabari, the consumer was “a reasonably prudent consumer […] shopping for
an expensive product like a luxury car.”101 In terms of the nature of goods, a consumer
searching for a Lexus would probably never be subjected to initial interest confusion
visiting any site other than lexus.com [such as buy-a-lexus.com or buyorleaselexus.com]
and believe that it is a Lexus-sponsored site. “Because the official Lexus site is almost
certain to be found at lexus.com, it’s far less likely to be found at other sites containing
the word Lexus.”102
Network Automation is the case where the Ninth Circuit gave unlimited decisionmaking power to the consumers and simply stated that “[t]hey fully expect to find some
sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain name or search engine
summary.”103 The consumers of the 21st century “don’t form any firm expectations about
the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing page – if then.”104
On the other hand, initial confusion is highly probable to affect particular
consumers looking for certain types of products and services, such as movie watchers
looking for Hollywood gossip and movie reviews105 and adult entertainment consumers
looking for graphic materials.106 If similar products are offered somewhere else, diversion
towards competitors’ sites can occur.
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For instance, in Geico, a Fourth Circuit case, the plaintiff GEICO pointed to “the
unique nature of the car insurance business [and] contend[ed] that because customers
seek an average of fewer than two quotes before purchasing car insurance, even in the
Internet context the company loses significant business from the alleged initial confusion
that misdirects potential customers who originally searched on “GEICO” to sites where
they can obtain other companies' quotes but not GEICO's.”107 Depending on the
consumer and the product searched for, the question of consumer diversion should be
treated differently.
Instead of trusting the consumer to make the choice only because she is a
sophisticated 21st century browser, I believe the crucial inquiry should take into account
the nature of the products and goods that are the subject of an alleged trademark
infringement claim, the goals and expectations of the consumer, the specificity of market
in discussion and the ultimate goal that the consumer wishes to attain, whether it is
buying a luxury good or accessing some routine product or service.

VI. ADWORDS – BENEFICIAL TOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE?
Technology travels across country borders and oceans. While trademark owners
are policing their marks, and courts are implementing new tests for the Internet-related
trademark infringement claims, AdWords tool can potentially benefit international
trade.108 Firms with limited capabilities can forego direct marketing (i.e. TV
commercials, ad campaigns, etc.) in targeted countries and simply resort to AdWords tool
that will provide worldwide coverage as long as there is access to computers.
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It seems that “AdWords facilitates the free flow of international trade and
commerce in a way that a state-based trade policy cannot.”109 Among the advantages of
such strategy are low costs to AdWords account holders, access to an expansive audience
and little intervention from national governments.110
This scheme that is beneficial to certain companies and to a large number of
consumers goes against the interests of the holders of those trademarks that are being
used as keywords. Trademark owners are making the same assumption as the courts did
in the Ninth Circuit,111 specifically dismissing the fact that “consumers entering a search
query containing a trademarked term are often not looking for the exact match to, for
example, the trademark holder’s website. Instead they not only expect to see, but also
want to see search results that include links to competitors’ websites.”112
Assuming consumers are looking for one specific product bearing the trademark
used as a keyword, consumers would have to undergo extensive on-line searches in order
to gather an extensive survey of competitors. Otherwise, their search results will not
contain the trademark holder’s ads. “If they never view the competitor’s ads, they will
have much less awareness that such competitors exist.”113 Restriction on use of keywords
would constrain freedom of choice and trade. Consumers would be limited to local and
recognized marks and not allow competitors of the trademark owners to market
themselves.
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AdWords seems to encourage competition by allowing the consumer to be the
decision-maker. The ability to pick and choose by “trial and error”114 is within the
capabilities of the 21st century sophisticated consumer.
The reality of today’s economy is that competitors have to battle for their market
share and for their consumers. How is Google AdWords tool different from the
traditional advertising campaigns? Companies resort to marketing to come up with the
“winner” strategy to stand out among competitors and also protect their marks from
becoming generic and unprotected.115 In Google’s world, trademark owners can stand out
by buying their own trademarks, “an equivalent effort to ensure continued association
with their marks in the eyes of consumers.”116 Looking at this issue from a purely
economic standpoint, AdWords is an advantage for international trade.
Trademark owners though are looking at the issue from a purely trademark
infringement angle and overlook the potential benefit of AdWords for the market
competition. AdWords can potentially help small companies achieve some recognition
and break into the market. At the same time, the established market participants worry
that the new entrants might get a free-ride on the their reputation by diverting consumers
through the AdWords tool.
This is a battle that will be a recurring issue in a world driven by technology.
Acknowledging that Internet-related trademark analysis had to move forward, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the Brookfield decision became obsolete.117 While not openly
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overruling the Brookfield court, the Ninth Circuit advocated for flexibility and for taking
into account relevant factors to each case.
Therefore, as the sophisticated consumer becomes more knowledgeable and the
technology more evolved, courts should include new factors in the trademark
infringement analysis. In addition, courts should always consider the nature of products
or services in dispute, the goals and expectations of consumers and the reputation and
market share of competitors.
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